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MAROON AND SLAVE COMMUNITIES IN 
SOUTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1865
TIM LOCKLEY AND DAVID DODDINGTON*
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resistance and solidarity among the enslaved. Historians have documented 
how overlapping communities and neighborhood distinctions complicated 
the politics of slave solidarity. Indeed, it has been noted that the very act of 
forming supportive communities could mean the exclusion of those deemed 
outsiders, with Kaye remarking that the enslaved established principles of 
solidarity “most pointedly in capturing runaway strangers from outside the 
neighborhood.”6  It is clear that when discussing resistance and runaways, 
early revisionist notions of a “code of the group,” whereby fugitives could 
simply rely on the support of their fellow slaves, has been dismantled in 
favor of more detailed explorations of particular contexts and personal 
considerations.7
Yet while encounters between slaves and individual runaways have 
been used to provide evidence of the divisions within the black populace of 
North America, interactions between enslaved communities and members 
of another distinctive type of community, maroons, have received less at-
tention. Maroon communities were formed by escaped slaves in woods, 
swamps, and mountains throughout the southern United States. Although 
“many runaway slaves left their plantations only for short periods of time 
and were either caught or returned voluntarily after a few days or weeks,” 
some had the skill and will to form autonomous communities in the wilder-
ness and “had no intention of returning to slavery.”8 These communities 
were organized comparatively free from white interference and offer us the 
opportunity to see how African Americans established themselves when they 
had a limited chance to do so. However, judging from the historiography, 
maroon communities are viewed as less important in North America than 
in the Caribbean or Latin America.9 This is perhaps understandable when 
6 Kaye, Joining Places, 120.
7 John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum 
South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 76.
8 Timothy James Lockley, ed., Maroon Communities in South Carolina: A Docu-
mentary Record (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009), ix.
9 See, for example, Richard Price, ed., Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities 
in the Americas, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); Gad 
Heuman, ed., Out of the House of Bondage: Runways, Resistance and Marronage in 
Africa and the New World (Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass and Company, 1986); Patrick 
J. Carroll, “Mandinga: The Evolution of a Mexican Runaway Slave Community, 
1735–1827,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 19 (October 1977): 488–505; 
Paul Lokken, “A Maroon Moment: Rebel Slaves in Early Seventeenth-Century 
Guatemala,” Slavery and Abolition 25 (December 2004): 44–58; Mavis C. Campbell, 
“Marronage in Jamaica: Its Origin in the Seventeenth Century,” in Comparative 
Perspectives on Slaves in New World Plantation Societies, ed. Vera Rubin and Arthur 
Tuden (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1977), 389–419; Gilbert C. Din, 
“ ‘Cimarrones’ and the San Malo Band in Spanish Louisiana,” Louisiana History 21 
(Summer 1980): 232–262. Exceptions include Herbert Aptheker, “Maroons Within 
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one considers the undeniable impact of marronage in these regions, and 
it is not our intention to claim that the practice was as extensive in North 
America as it was in Jamaica, Surinam, or Brazil. Whereas these regions 
saw the creation of viable and enduring maroon communities far from 
European settlements, at times containing thousands of runaways, the 
evidence suggests that marronage in North America was on a far smaller 
scale. Nevertheless, numbers are not everything. To dismiss maroon com-
munities or subsume them within the rubric of runaways may overlook their 
potential to further our knowledge of the tensions between overlapping 
communities of people and the politics of solidarity among the enslaved. 
Maroon communities could challenge neighborhood distinctions, exposing 
EQPƀKEVUCPFPGIQVKCVKQPUVJCVETQUUGFRNCPVCVKQPDQWPFCTKGU(WTVJGTOQTG
considering the relative strength and aggression of maroon communities 
KPEQORCTKUQPVQKPFKXKFWCNQTUOCNNGTITQWRUQHTWPCYC[UUGGMKPIƀKIJV
those who remained in bondage were forced to negotiate and interact with 
them in different ways. 
This article concentrates on South Carolina because evidence of ma-
roon activity is more abundant for this state than any other. This is not 
to say that maroon communities were absent in other parts of the South: 
maroons were active wherever and whenever slavery existed, especially in 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama. Colonial slave populations were, 
of course, more African and less acculturated than their nineteenth-century 
descendants. Even so, marronage occurred from the oldest states along 
the Atlantic seaboard to the newest southwestern additions. As early as 
1729, the governor of Virginia reported that a group of runaway slaves had 
settled “in the fastness of the neighbouring mountains,” and he feared they 
“would very soon be encreas’d by the accession of other Runaways and 
prove dangerous Neighbours to our frontier Inhabitants.”10  While the Ap-
palachians were attractive in the eighteenth century due to sparse  European 
settlement, they did not retain their allure after the American Revolution 
as whites spread inland. In fact, the largest single maroon community in 
North America was almost certainly formed in the Great Dismal Swamp 
on the border between Virginia and North Carolina. One visitor to the area 
in 1784 was told that “run-away Negroes have resided in these places for 
the Present Limits of the United States,” Journal of Negro History 24 (April 1939): 
167–184; Aptheker, “Additional Data on American Maroons,” Journal of Negro His-
tory 32 (October 1947): 452–460; Daniel O. Sayers, P. Brendan Burke, and Aaron M. 
Henry, “The Political Economy of Exile in the Great Dismal Swamp,” International 
Journal of Historical Archaeology (March 2007): 60–97. Lockley’s Maroon Communities is 
the most recent attempt to foreground marronage in the United States and contains 
all of the surviving primary-source material for South Carolina. 
10 Quoted in Sally E. Hadden, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the 
Carolinas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 30.
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twelve, twenty, or thirty years and upwards, subsisting themselves in the 
swamp upon corn, hogs, and fowls, that they raised on some of the spots 
PQVRGTRGVWCNN[WPFGTYCVGTPQTUWDLGEVVQDGƀQQFGFCUHQTV[PKPGRCTVUQH
ſHV[QHKVCTGCPFQPUWEJURQVUVJG[JCXGGTGEVGFJCDKVCVKQPUCPFENGCTGF
UOCNNſGNFUCTQWPFVJGO[GVVJGUGJCXGCNYC[UDGGPRGTHGEVN[KORGPGVTCDNG
to any of the inhabitants of the country around, even to those nearest to 
and best acquainted with the swamps.” Consequently, runaways “in these 
horrible swamps are perfectly safe, and with the greatest facility elude the 
most diligent of their pursuers.”11 
The attraction of the Dismal Swamp for maroons—namely, its inacces-
sibility—also means that we have few accounts of the communities formed 
there, since literate whites rarely risked visiting its dense interior. Far better 
documented are the maroons of South Carolina. Of all the colonies (and the 
states that came later) on the mainland of North America, South Carolina 
most closely replicated the demography of Caribbean islands like Jamaica, 
Barbados, and Hispaniola. By 1708 enslaved Africans formed a majority 
of South Carolina’s population, the only mainland colony in which this 
happened, and in the coastal parishes dominated by rice plantations, up to 
80 percent of the population was enslaved. The slave population of South 
Carolina also was more African and became creolized more slowly than 
VJGQVJGTUKIPKſECPVEQPEGPVTCVKQPQHUNCXGUKPEQNQPKCN0QTVJ#OGTKECKP
Virginia. Even in the 1780s, about a third of the one hundred thousand 
slaves living in South Carolina had been born in Africa.12 
Given that South Carolina had a large enslaved population, many of 
whom had memories of freedom before enslavement, it is not surprising 
VJCVCUKIPKſECPVPWODGTTCPCYC[$GVYGGPCPFUNCXGJQNFGTU
advertized for more than two thousand fugitive slaves in South Carolina 
newspapers, though this likely was only a small fraction of those who actu-
ally ran away since advertising was expensive and many masters hoped, 
PQVWPTGCUQPCDN[VJCVHWIKVKXGUYQWNFTGVWTP'XGPYJGPUNCXGUƀGFFWG
to mistreatment, the desire to be back among family and friends on the 
plantation usually was strong. Plus, comparatively few slaves possessed the 
survival skills to remain truants for long. Most returned home voluntarily, 
hungry and cold, or were caught by special hunting parties of overseers and 
dogs. Runaways were predominantly young and male, and they had often 
11 John Ferdinand Smyth, A Tour of the United States of America: Containing an 
Account of the Present Situation of That Country (1784), in Lockley, Maroon Communi-
ties, xvii.
12 Philip D. Morgan, Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century 
Chesapeake and Lowcountry (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of 
Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998), 58–61.
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been sold several times.13 Some during the colonial period struck out for 
freedom among Indians tribes in the West or the Spanish in Florida; in the 
nineteenth century, they headed for the North. An intermediate step was 
marronage, remaining hidden relatively locally to the place of enslavement, 
but with no intention of returning to slavery. These maroons usually found 
strength in numbers by banding together with other runaways and built 
camps for themselves that afforded shelter and sometimes a communal 
planting ground.
It should be noted that no contemporary South Carolina source used the 
term “maroon” to describe long-term fugitives. It is used here to distinguish 
maroons from the short-term truants, even though both can legitimately be 
VGTOGFőTWPCYC[UŒ6JGTGKUPQUGVFGſPKVKQPCUVQYJGPCVTWCPVGXQNXGF
into a maroon, but being absent for a considerable length of time was a key 
criterion. The South Carolina legislature itself made a distinction between 
truants who were absent less than three months and those “notorious run-
away slaves who shall be run-away 12 months.” The latter, “which runaway 
and lie out for a considerable space of time, at length become desperate, 
CPFUVCPFWRQPVJGKTFGſCPEGYKVJMPKXGUYGCRQPUQTCTOUŒEQWNFDG
pursued by any white person, and “if such run-away cannot be otherwise 
taken it shall be lawful to kill such notorious offenders.”14 Most maroon 
communities existed for a few years, but the Savannah River maroons, 
who lived on the border between South Carolina and Georgia and came 
to prominence in 1786 and 1787, had existed since at least 1782 and could 
well have developed from older maroon communities that resided in the 
same location as far back as 1765.15
The geography of low-country South Carolina was exceptionally 
conducive to the formation of maroon communities. Numerous rivers, of 
which the Santee, Cooper, Ashley, Edisto, and Savannah were only the most 
notable, slowly meandered their way toward the sea and were edged by 
large, interlocking swamps. While rice cultivation tamed the tidal swamps 
adjacent to South Carolina’s major rivers in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the plantations fronting the rivers normally backed up to exten-
sive, overgrown swamps. These “back swamps” were different from the 
rice swamps because, despite both being areas of low, marshy ground, 
the poor drainage of the back swamps rendered them unsuitable for tidal 
13 Daniel E. Meaders, “South Carolina Fugitives as Viewed through Local 
Colonial Newspapers with Emphasis on Runaway Notices, 1732–1801,” Journal of 
Negro History 40 (April 1975): 288–319.
14 R. Nicholas Olsberg, ed., The Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, 23 April 
1750–31 August 1751, Colonial Records of South Carolina (Columbia: Published for 
the South Carolina Department of Archives and History by the University of South 
Carolina Press, 1974), 287–288. 
15 On this particular group, see Lockley, Maroon Communities, chap. 3.
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cultivation. To planters the back swamps, dominated by large cypress and 
tupelo trees, were of little productive use and consequently ignored. This 
neglect left many spaces for maroons to occupy and make their own. Thus, 
while plantations were ostensibly places of order and regimentation, the 
back swamps remained marginal zones untamed by Europeans, densely 
forested and full of dangerous fauna such as alligators and snakes. Since 
planters frequently owned large tracts of land, the typical layout of a plan-
tation involved a “big house” close to the river and a “settlement” for the 
slaves, often some distance away. This arrangement placed the enslaved 
close to the swamps and gave them the opportunity to become familiar 
with these uninhabited environments. As one historian notes, the woods 
and swamps were liminal areas “that planters owned but that slaves had 
mastered.”16  It is all too easy for contemporary maps to give the impression 
that white mastery extended over the entire landscape, but planter control 
of the isolated back swamps was loose at best.
References to maroon activity in South Carolina start in the early eigh-
teenth century and continue to the Civil War with peaks during the imperial 
crisis of the 1760s, in the aftermath of the American Revolution in the 1780s, 
and during the 1810s and 1820s. While the enslaved population in South 
%CTQNKPCFKFGXQNXGFWTKPIVJGGKIJVGGPVJCPFſTUVJCNHQHVJGPKPGVGGPVJ
centuries, becoming increasingly acculturated and less African, it seems 
to have had minimal impact on marronage. There is little to suggest that 
maroons in South Carolina were more likely to have been born in African 
VJCP#OGTKECQTXKEGXGTUC4CVJGTOCTTQPCIGCRRGCTUVQJCXGƀCTGFWR
when whites were divided amongst themselves, as they were over the 
Stamp Act or during the Revolution, with the enslaved attempting to seize 
upon lapses in vigilance brought about by the unrest. 
Maroon groups were initially formed by runaway slaves who met 
GKVJGTD[CEEKFGPVQTFGUKIPKPYQQFUCPFUYCORUVJCVYGTGUWHſEKGPVN[
remote to permit the creation of a separate settlement with semi-permanent 
buildings. One maroon settlement in 1765 was “a Square Consisting of four 
Houses seventeen feet long and fourteen feet wide”; among the supplies in 
VJGőVQYPŒYGTGő-GVVNGUſHVGGP$WUJGNUQHTQWIJ4KEG$NCPMGVU2QVVU
Pales Shoes Axes and many other Tools.”17 Another camp was described 
in 1787 as being “700 yds in length, & about 120 in width.” It contained 
twenty-one houses, enough to accommodate up to two hundred people, 
with “the whole of the cleared land . . . planted in rice and potatoes.”18 Food 
16 S. Max Edelson, Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 67.
17 South Carolina Council Journal, December 9, 1765, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 20.
18 Colonel James Gunn to Brigadier General James Jackson, May 6, 1787, in 
Lockley, Maroon Communities, 58.
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in their bellies and roofs over their heads were vital for maroons’ endur-
ing survival, and their success in securing these essentials is documented. 
A maroon camp found near Georgetown in 1824 “consisted of snug little 
habitations” stocked with “ducks, turkeys, vegetables, and beef” as well 
as plenty of rice. A nearby camp two years later included “a large quantity 
QHDGGHCſPGHCVEQYRQVUENQVJGUCJQIRGPYGNNUFWICPFGXGT[
necessary preparation for a long residence.”19
Maroon communities stood a better chance of lasting if they had suf-
ſEKGPV RGQRNG VQ JGNR UCHGIWCTF VJG UGVVNGOGPV CPF KPFGGF QPG QH VJG
distinguishing features of maroons was that they tended to band together 
in a common cause. Ideally, maroon communities needed people to tend 
crops; to obtain additional supplies of food, utensils, and weapons; to act 
CU UGPVTKGU CPF KH PGEGUUCT[ VQ ſIJV )TQWRU QH ſXG VQ VGP KPFKXKFWCNU
were less likely to thrive than groups of twenty or more. Estimates of the 
size of maroon communities in South Carolina ranged from a “band” or 
“gang” of up to ten people to “large gangs” or “great numbers,” which 
perhaps amounted to more than a hundred.20 With reports of maroons 
being “abundantly  provided with delicacies as well as necessaries,” it is 
perhaps not surprising that their secret settlements acted as something of 
a magnet for runaway slaves.21  New fugitives augmented the numbers 
of maroons, and ultimately, whites came to believe that one of the main 
threats posed by maroon groups was that they encouraged and attracted 
CFFKVKQPCNTWPCYC[U/CTQQPUD[FGſPKVKQPJCFOCPCIGFVQTGOCKPDG-
yond white control for some time, and planters felt that this success meant 
“others are encouraged to follow the same course and those at home become 
disorderly and insubordinate.”22 Planters in Christ Church Parish, north 
of Charleston, described how the good escape of one runaway in 1822 had 
TGUWNVGFKPCPQVJGTLQKPKPIJKOKPCPFCPCFFKVKQPCNſXGRCTGPVUYKVJ
three children, “joined the same ring leader” in 1825.23
Maroon communities differed from other types of communities formed 
by Africans and African Americans in South Carolina in a number of inter-
esting ways. For one thing, they were, by necessity, far more concerned with 
security. Plantation slaves could not organize military-style units, nor were 
19 Charleston Mercury, December 24, 1824, and Georgetown Gazette, June 13, 1826, 
in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 121. 
20 For examples of maroon communities that supposedly were more than one 
hundred strong, see South Carolina Commons House of Assembly Journal, January 
14, 1766, and Gazette of the State of Georgia (Savannah), October 19, 1786, in Lockley, 
Maroon Communities, 24, 45.
21 Charleston Mercury, December 24, 1824, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 121.
22 South Carolina General Assembly petition, 1829, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 124–125.
23 Ibid.
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their villages protected by hidden paths, sentries, and earthworks. Maroons 
had these security measures since they existed in a state of permanent crisis 
due to the fear of military attack. It is noteworthy that maroons in Jamaica 
and Surinam employed similar defensive techniques, possibly suggesting a 
common African origin.24  Settlements were constructed far from navigable 
TKXGTUCPFſPFKPIVJGOTGSWKTGFNQPIVTGMUCETQUUFKHſEWNVVGTTCKP1PG
band of soldiers in pursuit of a group of maroons travelled “at least four 
miles” into a swamp, some of the time through waist-deep water, all the 
while exposing themselves to alligator attack.25   Such conditions deterred all 
but the most determined pursuers, and even when settlements were found, 
VJG[EQWNFDGYGNNHQTVKſGF5WTTQWPFKPIQPGECORYCUőCMKPFQHDTGGEJ
work about 4 feet high” constructed out of “logs & cane that came out of 
the cleared ground,” while the single, narrow entrance “would admit but 
QPGRGTUQPVQRCUUCVCVKOGŒ1PGJWPFTGFCPFſHV[[CTFUFQYPUVTGCOC
sentry was posted, and “about two miles below their camp they had fallen 
large logs across the creek in order to prevent boats passing up (small canoes 
might pass at high water).”26  Another settlement was “situated on small 
elevations, surrounded by extensive arrears of marsh. By climbing a high 
tree on each of them, a complete view of the bay, creeks and surrounding 
island, was presented to the spectator, while he could remain concealed 
by the foliage.”27
1PN[YGNNCTOGFJKIJN[FTKNNGFCPFFKUEKRNKPGFVTQQRUEQWNFJQRGVQ
launch an assault on a maroon settlement, especially when the defenders 
would almost certainly have advance warning of attack. Informal posses of 
planters lacked both the numbers and the tactical know-how to seriously 
threaten the largest settlements. Maroons were often organized into small 
companies, each with guns, which acted as independent raiding parties or 
YGTGCDNGVQNCWPEJRKPEGTOQXGOGPVUCICKPUVGPGOKGU1PGECOREQPVCKPGF
QXGTVJKTV[IWPUIKXKPIOCTQQPUCHQTOKFCDNGXQNWOGQHſTGRQYGT28 As-
saults on maroon positions, even by regular troops, evidently entailed risk. 
In one such attack in 1786, four soldiers were wounded and “the Negroes 
came down in such numbers that it was judged advisable to retire to their 
boats, from which the Negroes attempted to cut them off.” A complete 
TQWVYCUQPN[CXGTVGFD[VJGFKUEJCTIGQHCRKGEGQHſGNFCTVKNNGT[NQCFGF
24 Sylvia R. Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 52.
25 South Carolina Council Journal, December 9, 1765, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 20.
26 Gunn to Jackson, May 6, 1787, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 58.
27 Charleston Mercury, December 24, 1824, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 121.
28 South Carolina Council Journal, December 9, 1765, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 20.
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with grapeshot, which wounded many of the maroons.29 Maroon leaders 
even gave themselves military titles such as captain or general; one maroon 
in the 1780s called himself “Captain Cudjoe” in imitation of the famous 
Jamaican maroon leader of the 1730s.30  Internal leadership disputes could 
occur over the “share of plunder” and concerning raiding policy, but unity 
of purpose was crucial to the long-term survival of maroon communities. 
Only by working together for the collective good could maroons hope to 
QDVCKPUWHſEKGPVHQQFVQNKXGCPFJCXGCEJCPEGCVFGHGPFKPIVJGOUGNXGU
against attack.31
Maroon societies also were heavily masculinized in comparison to 
other African and African American communities in North America. Men 
constituted about 80 percent of fugitives from plantations, according to 
several studies of runaway advertisements in newspapers, and they tended 
to predominate among maroons.32  The relatively small number of women 
YJQLQKPGFQTYGTGHQTEGFKPVQOCTQQPITQWRUWPFGTVQQMURGEKſETQNGUKP
the community. These included planting rice and vegetables in specially 
cleared spaces and caring for children. No women took part in raids or were 
reported as being armed—such activities were exclusively male. There were 
occasional reports of children living among maroons, but the skewed gender 
ratio and the short-lived nature of many maroon communities resulted in 
limited opportunities for family formation. Maroons were therefore more 
likely to reside in homosocial groups than those who remained enslaved, 
with an emphasis on communal and collective violence and the absence of 
families that might curb such tendencies.
To those remaining enslaved, we might anticipate that maroons became 
JGTQKERGTJCRUGXGPO[VJKEſIWTGU/CTQQPUYJQUVTWEMCICKPUVRNCPVGT
CWVJQTKV[ CPF RQYGT YGTG SWKVG RQUUKDN[ HWNſNNKPI VJG UGETGV FGUKTGU QH
the oppressed. While overt resistance could spell summary execution for 
UNCXGUCPFKPFKXKFWCNTWPCYC[UHCEGFVTGOGPFQWUFKHſEWNVKGUKPGUECRG
OCTQQPUJCFVJGECRCEKV[VQſIJVDCEM+PVYQYJKVGOGPQH%JTKUV
Church Parish “came upon a camp of runaway Negroes” and captured two 
of them. However, within hours the rest of the maroon gang, apparently 
numbering more than twenty, had ambushed the white men, shooting one 
of them dead.33  In such direct refutations to notions of black cowardice and 
29 Gazette of the State of Georgia1EVQDGTKP.QEMNG[Maroon Communi-
ties, 45. 
305GG.QEMNG[Maroon Communities
31ő6TKCN4GEQTFQH.GYKUŒ/C[KP.QEMNG[Maroon Communities
32/GCFGTUő5QWVJ%CTQNKPC(WIKVKXGUŒ,QJP*QRG(TCPMNKPCPF.QTGP
Schweninger, Runaway Slaves: Rebels on the Plantation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 211–212.
33 Columbian Herald 
%JCTNGUVQP/C[CPFCharleston Morning Post, 
and Daily Advertiser,WPGKP.QEMNG[Maroon Communities, 42.
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inferiority, maroons offered a symbolic and actual threat to slavery and 
white mastery that conceivably could inspire others. Some masters certainly 
believed that maroon communities interacted with slaves across plantation 
boundaries and were provided with information to help them avoid white 
hunting parties. Charles Manigault, owner of Silk Hope Plantation on the 
Cooper River near Charleston, commented that “no overseer, or Planter 
should speak on such subjects even before a small house boy, or girl, as 
they communicate all that they hear to others, who convey it to the spies 
of the runaways, who are still at home.”34  Such cooperative and protective 
networks of solidarity support assertions by historians that the enslaved 
EQWNFUJCTGCEQFGQHJQPQTYKVJHWIKVKXGUCPFſIJVKPIOCTQQPUUJQYKPI
“respect to one another by hiding and feeding runaways and refusing to 
betray other bondsmen.”35
Yet the extant sources singularly fail to suggest that maroons were 
actively assisted by plantation slaves on a regular basis. To the contrary, 
they highlight the constant tension and negotiation that marked interactions 
between the two groups. Maroons were forced to engage with plantation 
EQOOWPKVKGUUKPEGPQOCTQQPUGVVNGOGPVYCUGPVKTGN[UGNHUWHſEKGPVDWVKV
KUENGCTVJCVVJGRNCPVCVKQPVGTTCKPEQWNFDGEQOGCDCVVNGſGNF(QTOCTQQP
communities, neighboring plantations were vital sources of corn, beef, ba-
con, and other supplies such as tools, guns, powder, and ammunition. In 
fact, the evidence points to maroons regularly entering plantations to gain 
needed supplies. These visits were often characterized as “raids,” like the 
one at a Mr. Wolmar’s plantation which resulted in the removal of “every 
valuable he possessed.”36 Of course, it is possible that slaveholders were 
unwilling to countenance the complicity of their slaves in assisting maroons, 
but the enslaved may have had their own reasons for resenting these kinds 
of encroachments and shared their owners’ opinions of them, particularly 
considering that the communal aspect of marronage commonly made the 
VJGHVUOQTGOCVGTKCNN[UKIPKſECPVVJCPVJQUGQHKPFKXKFWCNTWPCYC[U(WT-
thermore, the militaristic nature of the incursions could place members of 
the raided community in very real danger. 
Maroons took what they wanted or needed, even though this may have 
adversely affected plantation slaves. If maroons put the enslaved community 
in danger or at risk of punishment, then rather than receiving food supplies 
34 James M. Clifton, ed., Life and Labor on Argyle Island: Letters and Documents of a 
Savannah River Rice Plantation, 1833–1867 (Savannah, Ga.: Beehive Press, 1978), 313.
35 T. J. Desch Obi, Fighting for Honor: The History of African Martial Art Traditions 
in the Atlantic World (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 112.
36 General James Jackson to Governor George Matthews, no date, in Lockley, 
Maroon Communities, 46.
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from the plantation population, it was far more likely that they would be 
betrayed. On occasion slaves actively assisted whites in the recapture of 
maroons, and the more desperate, violent, and notorious the maroon, the 
more likely it seems that other slaves aided in their capture. In February 
1820, a young white man, Thomas Deliesseline, was killed on his father’s 
plantation on Dewee’s Island, north of Charleston, by a “party of runaway 
negroes.” Some maroons were apprehended at the scene but Albro, the 
one who shot Deliesseline in the face, escaped. Apparently unconcerned 
about the loyalty of his slaves, Deliesseline’s father “armed his Negroes, 
and sent them in pursuit of the murderous gang,” but Albro had swam 
from the island back to the mainland and attempted “to secrete himself in 
one of Mr. Hibben’s negro houses.” It was left to Hibben’s enslaved driver 
to calmly effect Albro’s capture.37 Drivers occupied contentious positions 
of power that could be used to abuse or protect other slaves, and T. J. Desch 
Obi notes that “status in the master’s culture was not always enough to 
override steadfastness” with rebellious or resistant slaves.38 However, in 
this instance, the driver had no qualms about apprehending a dangerous 
individual and handing him over to whites, even though the fugitive’s fate 
would have been certain.
Sometimes slaves were forced to help their masters pursue runaways. 
Planters hunting maroons on the Pee Dee River in 1826 took with them 
“several trusty negroes,” who presumably were familiar with the river 
swamps and could act as guides. While these slaves had no choice but to 
do as their masters instructed, those sympathetic to the maroons could 
have delayed the search or deliberately led their masters away from known 
camps. In this case, though, a camp was discovered, but the maroons es-
caped into an “impenetrable” swamp.39 Planter threats could be enough to 
persuade slaves to betray the location of maroons, if only to avoid being 
beaten themselves, but it also is apparent that some slaves actively desired 
to ingratiate themselves with whites. It was most likely the prospect of 
ſPCPEKCNTGYCTFVJCVNGFVYQUNCXGU6QOCPF,CEMVQDTCXGőGXGT[JC\-
ard” in order to bring about the apprehension of one of “a gang of lawless 
& desperate runaways” near Georgetown.40 The captured man was later 
37
 City Gazette and the Commercial Daily Advertiser (Charleston), February 10 and 
14, 1820. Albro was executed on March 4. Ibid., March 6, 1820. 
38 Obi, Fighting for Honor, 112. For more information on drivers, see James M. 
Clifton, “The Rice Driver: His Role in Slave Management,” South Carolina Historical 
Magazine 82 (October 1981): 331–353.
39 Georgetown Gazette, June 13, 1826, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 121.
40 South Carolina General Assembly petition, 1834, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 119.
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VTKGFCPFGZGEWVGFYJKNG6QOCPF,CEMTGEGKXGFſHV[FQNNCTUGCEJHTQO
the South Carolina legislature.
If possible rewards tempted some slaves to betray maroons, the actions 
QHOCTQQPUVJGOUGNXGUEQWNFDGUWHſEKGPVVQCNKGPCVGQVJGTUNCXGU&WGVQ
their militaristic structure, maroon communities were more capable than 
individual runaways of making daring armed raids on plantations, and 
these inevitably led to the risk of injury to slaves. The use of buckshot 
OGCPVVJCVGXGPCYGNNCKOGFDNCUVHTQOCſTGCTOEQWNFCEEKFGPVN[OCKO
or even kill an innocent nearby slave, and sometimes lethal violence could 
DGWUGFSWKVGFGNKDGTCVGN[ōUJCTGFQRRTGUUKQPYCUPQVUWHſEKGPVVQURCTG
slaves from maroon violence. In November 1822, travelers in Saint An-
drew’s Parish, just outside of Charleston, were being “continually robbed 
by a gang of armed runaway Negroes.” Among their victims were “several 
negroes [who] were stopped and money and clothes taken from them and 
their persons kept in custody ’till after night.”41 Targeting slaves was an 
obvious avenue whereby maroons could lose the support of those who 
remained enslaved. When maroons near Wilmington, North Carolina, were 
reported to be “frequently robbing slaves” and “threatening to perpetrate 
more atrocious crimes,” it did not take long before “people of their own 
color informed against them.” A white posse swiftly captured all of these 
maroons as a direct result of the information given by slaves.42  In addition, 
some slaves might have resented the incursions by maroons on plantations, 
especially when they stole food. Any loss of provisions meant there was 
NGUUHQQFVQDGFKUVTKDWVGFVQVJGUNCXGUCPFYJGTGOCUVGTUNQUVUKIPKſECPV
sums through the depredations of maroons, they may have tried to recoup 
some of their losses by cutting allowances of food and clothing to the en-
slaved population. 
(QTEKDNGMKFPCRRKPIUKIPKſECPVN[CHHGEVGFVJGCVVKVWFGUQHRNCPVCVKQP
UNCXGUVQYCTFUOCTQQPU1PGUWEJEQGTEGFUNCXG6JGTQPVGUVKſGFCUVQ
how a chance encounter on the road resulted in his being forced to join a 
maroon gang. The maroon leader, Ben, “told Theron he must go with him 
and not go home as he feared should he be permitted to return he would 
inform that he had seen him which would prevent his being able to get 
away his wife and Children from his Mistresses Plantation.” Theron spent 
some months living as a maroon, raiding plantations for cattle and other 
PGEGUUKVKGUCNNVJGYJKNGENCKOKPIVQDGCHTCKFVQƀGGőCUVJG0GITQG$GPJCF
sometime before shott [sic] a fellow named Cork . . . for saying he wanted to 
go home.” Eventually, however, the opportunity to take a boat and escape 
41 City Gazette and the Commercial Daily Advertiser, November 2, 1822, and Balti-
more Patriot, November 19, 1822, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 105.
42 Raleigh Register (Raleigh, N.C.), October 28, 1828, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, xviii.
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arose, and Theron went back to his home plantation, signifying one example 
where personal and communal ties were more important than the relative 
HTGGFQOQHHGTGFD[OCTTQPCIG9JKNG6JGTQPŏUUVQT[QHKPVTCUNCXGEQPƀKEV
could have been the self-serving testimony of an otherwise implicated indi-
vidual, his experience was corroborated by another slave named John. John 
declared that Ben had threatened to kill “every Negro who should refuse 
to join him.” This aggressive stance towards plantation slaves was clearly 
counterproductive. Ben failed to garner the support of local slaves, who 
RGTEGKXGFJKOCUCVJTGCVTCVJGTVJCPCſIWTGVQDGNCWFGF7NVKOCVGN[VJG
information provided by John and Theron was extremely helpful to white 
planters, who used it to locate and destroy Ben’s maroon camp.43
Slaves who helped whites capture and kill maroons could be regarded 
as self-seeking, but they also may have been defending a particular sense 
of community. While individual runaways were forced to negotiate more 
subtly across neighborhood boundaries, the aggressive nature of marron-
age complicated the politics of solidarity among the enslaved in a direct 
manner. Runaways could and surely did threaten and coerce help from 
other slaves at times, but maroons were able to produce systematic vio-
lence. Where maroons acted violently against those left on the plantations 
by injuring or kidnapping them during raids, slaves had a vested interest 
in protecting themselves and their families from harm. These maroons had 
in effect gone rogue, failing to discriminate between those who had been 
responsible for their oppression—the white planters—and those who had 
shared it—the slaves. To the maroons, plantations were treasure troves of 
supplies to be plundered as required, regardless of who suffered as a result.
The story of one maroon leader in South Carolina gives further insight 
into how plantation slaves perceived and interacted with maroons. Few 
maroons had such an extended career as Joe. Physically imposing, “in the 
prime of life, a very stout and athletic man, at least six feet high,” Joe’s body 
bore testimony to his violent lifestyle, with “a scar on one of his cheeks, 

DGNKGXGFVQDGVJGTKIJVQEECUKQPGFD[VJGDKVGQHCPGITQKPCſIJVCUECT
from the cut of a sabre, believed to be on his right arm; [and] shot marks 
in both of his legs.”44#NVJQWIJJGſTUVCRRGCTUKPVJGYTKVVGPTGEQTFUKP
May 1821, Joe might well have been among a group of “runaway negros” 
hunted in the Santee River swamps near Pineville in the summer of 1819, 
since this is close to where he eventually would be killed in 1823.45 If Joe 
43 South Carolina Council Journal, December 9, 1765, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 19–20.
44 Proclamation of Governor Thomas Bennett, May 1821, in Lockley, Maroon 
Communities, 98.
45 Diary entry of Henry Ravenel, July 12, 1819, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 90. 
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was leading a maroon gang through the innumerable swamps adjacent to 
VJG5CPVGG4KXGTHTQOCUGCTN[CUJGFKFUQKPCOCPPGTVJCVCVſTUV
did not attract much attention from local whites. All that changed on the 
night of Sunday, May 27, 1821. Joe, together with two accomplices, landed 
on the plantation of George Ford on South Island near Georgetown with 
the intention of stealing cattle. Ford was alerted to their presence and went 
to investigate, but had barely set out when he was shot and killed by the 
maroons. The gun “had been loaded with slugs, and a ball,” and the use of 
numerous projectiles obviously increased the chance of hitting the target. 
Unfortunately for Ford, “the principal part of the slugs entered his head—the 
ball penetrated his breast,” killing him instantly. It was not just Ford who 
was injured by the raiding maroons, as two of Ford’s slaves also were hit 
by gunshots, “one of them severely near the temple and in the groin.” It 
was perhaps as a direct consequence of the violence perpetrated against the 
blacks that another of Ford’s slaves “concealed himself behind the ox that 
had been killed in the hopes to detect them in their attempt to remove it.” 
When this indeed happened, one of the maroons was captured. Another 
maroon was detained by the militia four days later, but Joe escaped into 
the swamps bordering the Santee.46
The Santee River swamps stretched from the Atlantic coast nearly to 
%QNWODKCOQTGVJCPQPGJWPFTGFCPFſHV[OKNGUCPF,QGGXKFGPVN[MPGY
VJGOYGNN*KUőQNFECORŒYCUKPVJGNCTIGUYCORCVVJGEQPƀWGPEGQHVJG
Wateree and Congaree Rivers, which formed the Santee below Columbia, 
close to his original Richland County plantation. He was variously mentioned 
as hiding in swamps in Lancaster, Charleston, and Georgetown Districts, 
all of which bordered the Santee or Wateree Rivers. After the murder, Joe’s 
immediate thought was to head inland from the coast, where George Ford’s 
RNCPVCVKQPYCUNQECVGFCPFVJGJWPVHQTJKOYCUOQUVKPVGPUGCPFſPF
refuge in the Georgetown District swamps until the search died down. At 
several points during the manhunt, Joe came into contact with plantation 
slaves, and on occasion, he received food and, most importantly, informa-
tion. Newspapers reported, “He has been several times driven into such 
situations as afforded the strongest hopes of his being taken; but the intel-
ligence and support furnished him from some of the neighboring plantations 
have hitherto assisted him to elude his pursuers.”47  It is not known whether 
the “intelligence and support” were given voluntarily or extorted, but on 
at least one occasion, Joe forced a free black woman at gun point “to give 
him a considerable quantity of bacon, corn and ammunition.”48
46 Charleston Courier, June 1, 1821, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 95.
47 Ibid., June 11, 1821, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 101.
48 Ibid.
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Hope of capturing Joe slowly faded and eventually he made his way 
inland, where he resumed his life of raiding plantations for supplies and 
recruits. On one such raid, at Dr. Lewis Raoul’s plantation in Sumter District, 
Joe seized an apparently unwilling woman “as his wife.” Some months 
later, a slave of Colonel J. B. Richardson was instrumental in “rescuing” 
this woman and returning her to Raoul, but in revenge for this act, Joe led 
CſXGOCPCTOGFTCKFQPVJG4KEJCTFUQPRNCPVCVKQPUKPINGFQWVVJGUNCXG
CUJGYQTMGFKPVJGſGNFUCPFMKNNGFJKO5WEJCFCTKPITCKFKPDTQCF
daylight and in front of the overseer, was a strong signal to other slaves 
VJCV,QGJCFPQHGCTQHYJKVGCWVJQTKV[CPFYCUYKNNKPICPFCDNGVQKPƀKEV
violence on slaves that crossed him, regardless of their master’s protection. 
Joe’s well-organized and heavily armed gang was able to act with impunity, 
striking when and where they chose, and few plantations would have had 
UWHſEKGPVCTOGFYJKVGOGPCVVJGTGCF[VQOQWPVCPGHHGEVKXGTGUKUVCPEG
As if to prove his preeminence, Joe later returned to Raoul’s plantation and 
took the rescued woman away again.49
Joe’s relationship with the enslaved was therefore somewhat utilitar-
ian. Those who provided food, ammunition, and information, whether 
voluntarily or coerced, were very useful, and it is doubtful that Joe could 
have survived so long as a maroon without their help. Furthermore, his 
violence and thefts did not deter everyone; new runaways augmented 
his band and ensured that he remained a formidable force, even after the 
capture and execution of certain gang members. Where Joe met resistance, 
he responded with violence and little regard for the wishes of other slaves. 
Women were taken by force, and those who opposed him could expect 
little mercy. Richardson’s slave had been “long threatened” for his actions 
in rescuing the woman from Joe’s camp, demonstrating that his killing 
was no heat-of-the-moment response, but rather a cold, calculated act of 
revenge.50  The kidnapping of individuals and brutal acts against perceived 
enemies—white and black—were hardly intended to endear Joe to those 
who remained enslaved.
For more than two years after the death of George Ford, Joe continued 
his bandit lifestyle with whites seemingly powerless to stop him. In the 
summer of 1821, local militia units spent time trying to capture Joe, and 
newspapers were full of praise for the “spirit and alacrity evinced by the 
different military corps, in their laborious and indefatigable pursuit, [which] 
entitle them to the highest commendation.”51  Some militia forces “have been 
day and night occupied in scouring the woods and swamps to the distance 
49 Southern Chronicle (Camden), September 17, 1823, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 108.
50 Ibid.
51 Charleston Courier, June 1, 1821, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 96.
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of twenty or thirty miles from town, notwithstanding the extreme heat of 
the weather and the heavy showers to which they have been exposed.”52 In 
spite of all this exertion, Joe remained at large. In July 1821, the Charleston 
Times commented: “The subtle African continues his lodgement [sic] in the 
border of the swamps, and prowls around the neighbouring settlements, 
KPFGſCPEGQHCNNVJGGHHQTVUVJCVJCXGDGGPOCFGVQCRRTGJGPFJKOŒ53  Joe 
YCUFGſPKVGN[VJGOCUVGTQHJKUGPXKTQPOGPV#VQPGRQKPVVJGPGYURCRGTU
reported that he was trapped on “a peninsula, or narrow strip of swamp, 
bounded by the Santee on one side, and a lake, which unites with the river, 
on the other. There is but one point at which he could escape by land, and 
that, we understand, is closely guarded.”54 A few days later, however, it 
was acknowledged that Joe had “escaped the vigilance of his pursuers in 
this neighbourhood.”55
By the early autumn of 1823, one local newspaper despaired that more 
than two years had elapsed since the murder of George Ford, yet Joe was 
still on the loose. The editors were aware that he “uses the most dense and 
impervious swamps, places himself at the head of fugitive slaves,” and 
“arms them,” and they lamented the fact that “this accomplished villain 
has been pursuing his course of plunder in the most tranquil and uninter-
rupted manner.”56  The Charleston newspapers had little clue as to how to 
catch him, though. One group of citizens in Pineville, which was located 
along the Santee River in extreme northern Charleston District, formed 
VJG2KPGXKNNG2QNKEG#UUQEKCVKQPQP1EVQDGTURGEKſECNN[őVQFGXKUG
a plan for apprehending” Joe, or “Forest,” as he was being called by this 
time.57  Joe was now “encamped in the vicinity of the [Santee] canal,” and 
his “gang of desperate runaways . . . have committed many depredations 
in this neighborhood and elsewhere.” Local whites were conscious that the 
OCTQQPECORYCUőUJGNVGTGFD[VJGFKHſEWNVKGUQHCPCRRTQCEJŒCPFVJG
OCTQQPUYGTGőUVTGPIVJGPGFD[ſTGCTOUCPFQVJGTYGCRQPUQHQHHGPEGŒ
%QPſFGPV KP VJGKTUGEWTG NQECVKQP VJGOCTQQPUőVJTGCVGPGFVJG NKXGUQH
many individuals . . . and carry on unmolested a system of open violence 
and robberies.” 
,QGŏUFGRTGFCVKQPUJCFPQVDGGPEQPſPGFVQYJKVGUCPFRNCPVGTUJQRGF
to exploit the possible divisions between maroons and those who remained 
52 Ibid., June 4, 1821, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 97.
53 Reported in the Providence Gazette (Providence, R.I.), July 18, 1821, in Lockley, 
Maroon Communities, 104.
54 Charleston Courier, June 11, 1821, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 101.
55 Ibid., June 15, 1821, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 102.
56 Southern Chronicle, September 17, 1823, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 108.
57 Secretary’s Book, October 2, 1823, Pineville Police Association Records, vol. 
1, 1823–1840, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 110.
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enslaved to their advantage. One planter, William Dubose, thought that 
“by secret offers of Reward to certain negroes, their agency and Assistance 
might so far be obtained, as to enable a party judiciously posted to surprise 
and take them.”58 The members of the Pineville Police Association agreed 
VQ VJKURNCPUWIIGUVKPI VJCV VJG[YGTGTGCUQPCDN[EQPſFGPV VJG[EQWNF
ſPFCUNCXGYKNNKPIVQDGVTC[,QG+PVJKUVJG[YGTGEQTTGEVCUNCXGPCOGF
Billy, owned by Austin Peary, provided “active and ready co-operation” 
in planning the capture of Joe, but events in the meantime rendered Billy’s 
JGNRUWRGTƀWQWUUKPEG ,QGYCUMKNNGFQP1EVQDGT9JGP VJG2KPGXKNNG
Police Association met again on October 5, Billy was paid forty-seven dol-
lars because Dubose believed that “but for Circumstances not within the 
controul of either Party complete success must have perfected their designs. 
6JKUHGNNQYJCFHWNſNNGFYKVJ(KFGNKV[VJG&WVKGUKORQUGFWRQPJKOCPF
had endangered his Life in the execution of them.” It is unclear why Billy 
EQQRGTCVGFYKVJ&WDQUGVJQWIJVJGſPCPEKCNKPEGPVKXGYCUUWDUVCPVKCN
Whatever his motivation, Billy evidently had little sympathy and solidarity 
for Joe and the other maroons and was willing to work with whites despite 
the possible threat of reprisal.59
Joe’s demise was affected by a “party of 23 men” who came down the 
Santee River from Clarendon District, and while contemporary newspapers 
make no mention of the involvement of a slave named Royal in luring Joe 
from his swamp refuge, other sources indicate that he played a pivotal 
role. Royal was a patroon, commanding a trading vessel that plied the 
river. “With considerable judgement [sic] and address,” he managed to lure 
Joe and three of his followers from their swamp hideout with an offer to 
trade. In reality Royal enticed the maroons into an ambush of armed white 
men, who immediately shot and killed Joe and his three companions. In 
1824 eighty-one planters from central South Carolina petitioned the state 
NGIKUNCVWTGVQOCPWOKV4Q[CNCPFEQPUGSWGPVN[HQTJKUőſFGNKV[CPFIQQF
conduct in making himself the immediate instrument in bringing to merited 
punishment an offender, against the laws of the land, and against the laws 
of God, of the worst character and of the highest gravity,” the state agreed 
to pay his owner seven hundred dollars for his freedom. The legislature 
declared that it was “the policy of this state to reward those slaves who thus 
distinguish themselves by way of inducement to others to do so likewise.”60
It is doubtful that whites would have been able to catch Joe without 
black help. Joe’s gang was reported to be “completely under his direction,” 
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 South Carolina General Assembly petition, 1874, and committee report, 1825, 
in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 117–119.
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and he obviously was a charismatic leader; even whites acknowledged that 
“he had the art and the address to inspire his followers with the most wild 
and dangerous enthusiasm.”616JGTWPCYC[UYJQLQKPGF,QGYGTGſGTEGN[
loyal, suggesting that they were unlikely to betray him even if captured. 
6JGOCTQQPUJCFőVJGCKFQHſTGCTOUŒUQCFKTGEVCUUCWNVQP,QGŏUECOR
was dangerous. Indeed, one white man was wounded by buckshot during 
VJGJWPVHQT,QGŏUICPI62  Whites also were mindful that Joe “had under his 
control whatever boats navigated that section of the river.” Most of those 
undertaking the transport of goods on the Santee were slaves, and Joe used 
“threats and persuasion” to obtain “information of every movement made 
QTRNCPFGXKUGFŒVQECRVWTGJKO(WTVJGTOQTGőJKUKPVKOCE[CPFKPƀWGPEG
over the negroes in the neighbourhood of his encampment rendered every 
attempt which had been made to take him, abortive.” Those who did not aid 
him were treated as enemies: “every individual who manifested a disposi-
tion to check him in his career of violence, or to assist in his apprehension” 
became “objects of his vengeance.” By surrounding himself with those 
whose loyalty could be relied upon and gathering up-to-date and accurate 
intelligence through threats and persuasion, Joe was able “to act with im-
RWPKV[ŒEQOOKVVKPIőVJGOQUVFCTKPIQWVTCIGUCPFKPQRGPFGſCPEGQH
the laws.”63  With his strategy evidently working and “emboldened by his 
successes,” Joe “plunged deeper and deeper into crime, until neither fear 
PQTFCPIGTEQWNFFGVGTJKOſTUVHTQOVJTGCVGPKPICPFVJGPHTQOGZGEWVKPI
a train of mischiefs we believe quite without a parallel in this country.”64
+H ,QGŏUDCPFKVT[YCUPQVGPQWIJ VQ UVKTYJKVG UNCXGJQNFGTU KPVQCE-
tion, his rumored “desemination [sic] of notions . . . among the blacks . . . 
calculated in the end to produce insubordination and insurrections with 
all the hideous train of evils that usually follow” compelled them to take 
his threat seriously.65 +VUJQWNFDGTGOGODGTGFVJCV&GPOCTM8GUG[ŏURNQV
QEEWTTGFKP%JCTNGUVQPYJKNG,QGYCUCVNCTIG2NCPVGTUHTQO5CKPV,QJPŏU
$GTMGNG[CPF5CKPV5VGRJGPŏU2CTKUJGUCUYGNNCU5WOVGTCPF4KEJNCPF&KU-
VTKEVUQTICPK\GFVJGOUGNXGUKPVQőEQORCPKGUŒCPFőUEQWTGF5CPVGG4KXGT
5YCORHTQOVJGEQPƀWGPEGQHVJGVYQTKXGTUVJCVHQTOKVVQ/WTT[ŏU(GTT[
CFKUVCPEGGXGPD[NCPFQHUKZV[OKNGUŒDWVőYGCTKGFFQYPD[GZEGUUKXG
HCVKIWGCPFTGPFGTGFFKURKTKVGFD[VJGPWODGTGZVGPVCPFEJCTCEVGTQHVJGKT
61 Milledgeville Recorder (Milledgeville, Ga.), October 21, 1823, and South Carolina 
General Assembly petition, 1874, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 112, 116.
62 Southern Chronicle, October 22, 1823, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 113.
63 Milledgeville Recorder, October 21, 1823, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 
112–113.
64 South Carolina General Assembly petition, 1874, in Lockley, Maroon Com-
munities, 116.
65 Ibid.
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places of retreat and concealment,” they were on the point of giving up 
when Royal offered his services. 
Royal took a considerable personal risk collaborating with whites, 
since he might easily have faced reprisals from those who supported Joe’s 
banditry. Inasmuch as the written record is silent on Royal’s motivation for 
helping slaveholders kill Joe, we are forced to speculate on why he actively 
sought to end Joe’s career on the Santee. Perhaps the most straightforward 
reason that presents itself relates to Royal’s employment. As a patroon, 
Royal transported goods on the Santee River, and Joe’s activities, accord-
KPIVQNQECNRNCPVGTUCVNGCUVJCFFKUTWRVGFVTCHſE$GKPICRCVTQQPYCUC
privileged position, necessarily involving an unusual degree of freedom 
of movement. Patroons could be away from their plantations for lengthy 
periods and rarely had to endure close white supervision. It also was com-
mon for enslaved boatmen to conduct business on their own account; the 
Georgetown District Grand Jury complained about “the practice of negroes 
PCXKICVKPIVJGTKXGTUCPFETGGMUKPƀCVUCPFDQCVUHQTEWVVKPIYQQFCPF
QVJGTRWTRQUGUCPFKPVJKUYC[ECTT[QPCVTCHſEYKVJPGITQGUQPVJGPGKIJ-
bouring plantations.”66 Joe’s interference could well have reduced Royal’s 
CDKNKV[VQOCMGRGTUQPCNRTQſVYJKNGVJGRTGEGFGPVQHJKUXKQNGPVCEVKQPU
may have fostered fear and suspicion.
Joe’s reputation for aggression toward those who opposed him was 
well known, and thus, any move against him needed to be decisive. Other-
wise, it would only increase the risk of a revenge attack. Joining forces with 
armed whites made an assault more likely to succeed. While Royal may 
have hoped for a monetary reward or the manumission that he eventually 
received, records suggest that he volunteered his help freely and was not 
responding to either an offer of a reward or an approach by whites. With-
out Royal’s assistance, local planters were convinced that they would have 
been unable to lure Joe out of his camp and ambush him. In order for the 
ambush to work, Joe needed to trust Royal, making it likely that the two 
had met previously. It is possible that Royal was one of those whom Joe had 
coerced with “threats and persuasion” to provide information on what local 
planters were planning. Joe’s own security measures in this sense helped 
to bring about his downfall, since he assumed that by dealing only with 
fellow blacks, he was safe from attack. Despite his ill-treatment of slaves, it 
seems that Joe thought no black would betray him. Royal, however, was one 
slave who did not feel any sense of racial solidarity with a dangerous 
maroon.
66 Presentment of the Grand Jury of Georgetown District, fall 1823, Grand Jury 
Presentments series, 1783–1877, Legislative Papers, 1782–1866, South Carolina 
Department of Archives and History, Columbia. 
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It is evident that communal bonds among black South Carolinians 
YGTG ƀGZKDNG CPF EQWNF VTCPUEGPF KUUWGU QH TCEG QT UJCTGF QRRTGUUKQP
Solidarity was negotiable among the enslaved, and the terms could differ 
dramatically. Multiple black communities overlapped in South Carolina 
before 1865, and maroons operated across plantation borders. While drawn 
from the same black population as the slave community, they existed free 
of white control in a state of semi-permanent warfare. In order to maintain 
their independence, they took supplies and recruits from plantations, ne-
gotiating with some slaves and violently repressing others. For maroons 
the damage this did to plantation economies, and therefore to the slaves 
residing on those plantations, was secondary to the survival of their own 
community. Slave communities may have been broadly sympathetic to the 
courage and example set by maroons, but the individuals that constituted 
these communities had to make personal choices to ensure maroons did 
not cause harm to themselves or those they cared for. Slaves and maroons 
EGTVCKPN[EQWNFKPVGTCEVJCTOQPKQWUN[YKVJTGRQTVUQHőGZVGPUKXGVTCHſEŒ
between the two groups on the wharves and streets of Georgetown.67 
Once raids on plantations began to impact slave communities negatively, 
however, support for maroons waned, and some actively assisted whites 
in their attempts to recapture or destroy maroon communities. Maroons 
may have offered a heroic vision of black resistance, striking back against 
white oppression, but few slaves were willing to see their own meager 
standards of living fall as a result. 
The story of South Carolina’s maroons reinforces the argument that 
historians lump all black people together at their peril. Multiple black 
communities existed in South Carolina—urban, rural, rice producing, cot-
VQPRTQFWEKPIFQOGUVKEſGNFUNCXGHTGGōCPFVQVJQUGYGUJQWNFCFF
“maroon.” The negotiations, violence, and betrayal that marked maroon 
and plantation relationships highlight further the complexity of interac-
tions among the enslaved. Although clearly established that the enslaved 
FGXGNQRGFőUVTCVGIKGUQHUWTXKXCNŒYKVJKPVJGEQPſPGUQHVJGKTDQPFCIG
it is worth emphasizing that no two strategies were the same, and some 
directly clashed with one another.68 There were slaves who curried favor 
with masters to win indulgences, while others exploited loopholes in the 
system to trade stolen goods. Some ran away, and a small number chose to 
resist with violence. While black South Carolinians almost certainly shared 
a distrust and dislike of white control, maroon communities exerted power 
CPFKPƀWGPEGQXGTVJGGPUNCXGFCPFVJGKTUWTXKXCNFGOCPFGFCYKNNKPIPGUU
67 Charleston Mercury, December 24, 1824, in Lockley, Maroon Communities, 121.
68 See William Dusinberre, Strategies for Survival: Recollections of Bondage in 
Antebellum Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009).
MAROON AND SLAVE COMMUNITIES 145
to lash out. This violence could threaten black as much as white, and in the 
politics of solidarity, maroons were not simply outsiders, but sometimes 
active threats.   
